Task Discretion, Labor Market Frictions and Entrepreneurship by Canidio, Andrea & Patrick, Legros
Task Discretion, Labor Market
Frictions and Entrepreneurship∗
Andrea Canidio†and Patrick Legros‡
This version: August 22, 2019
Abstract
Each job can be performed in several ways, which we call tasks. An agent’s per-
formance at a task is informative about his productivity at different tasks. But
tasks are not contractible: choosing tasks is the prerogative of management within
firms, and of the agent if he is an entrepreneur. Firms will invest in the discovery
of their workers’ productivity at different tasks only if they cannot easily move to
other firms. Therefore, labor-market frictions determine whether learning an agent’s
talent occur within firms, or whether an agent may become entrepreneur to acquire
task discretion.
JEL classification: D83, J24, J62, J63, L26, M13.
Keywords Task discretion, organizational choice, entrepreneurship, labor-
market frictions, entrepreneurial failures, learning.
∗This paper supersedes an earlier version titled “The Value of Entrepreneurial Failures:
Task Allocation and Career Concerns” (Canidio and Legros, 2016). We are grateful to
Carlos Casso Dominguez for excellent research assistance. We are also grateful to Chris
Avery, Raul Baptista, Werner Bönte, Jing-Yuan Chiou, Roberta Dessi, Robert Gibbons,
Denis Gromb, Thomas Hellmann, Andrea Mantovani, Massimo Riccaboni, Marko Terviö,
Peter Thompson, John van Reenen, Michael Waldman, Timothy van Zandt, conference
participants at the CEPR Workshop in Entrepreneurship Economics, the Annual Searle
Center Conference on Innovation Economics, the 2018 ASSA meetings, the Organizational
lunch workshop at MIT, the ZEW Conference on the Dynamics of Entrepreneurship, as well
as seminar participants at the University of Montréal, INSEAD, and HEC Paris. Legros
gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the European Research Council under the
European Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013 / ERC grant agreement
n°339950.)
†IMT School of Advanced Studies, Lucca and INSEAD.




Talent may be misallocated both within and between occupations. In this
paper we study how these two types of misallocation interact, and show that
the misallocation of talent within firms may cause an inefficient sorting across
occupations. We do so by building a two-period model in which agents first
sort between employment in a firm and entrepreneurship, and then between
different ways to do a job, which we call tasks. An agent’s productivity at
different tasks, i.e., his talent, is unknown but can be learned by observing
his performance at a task, with some tasks being more informative than oth-
ers. However, task allocation is not contractible. As in the property right
literature (Grossman and Hart, 1986), task allocation is chosen by owners or
management within firms, and by the agent himself if he is an entrepreneur.
Examples of non contractible tasks informative about talent are plentiful.
A contract with a scientist defines the objective of the research (e.g., find a
cure for Alzheimer) but not the exact experimental design, even if the exper-
imental design may reveal the scientist’s comparative talent at following well
established or unusual research paths. A contract with a new manager does
not specify the exact organizational chart of the firm (people under his au-
thority or people who have authority on him), and, as a consequence, does not
specify the extent to which he can delegate or centralize decisions. Delegating
or centralizing decisions may, however, reveal his comparative advantage at
different styles of management.
By showing that an agent may become entrepreneur to gain task discretion
and learn his talent, we bring to the literature a novel motive for entrepreneur-
ship. This motive resembles the well-documented “be one’s own boss” motive
(see for example the survey by Stephan et al., 2015). Importantly, however,
we do not assume that individuals have an intrinsic benefit from task discre-
tion, from being their own boss. Becoming an entrepreneur to acquire task
discretion is beneficial if and only if learning cannot occur within firms. This,
in turns, depends on the level of labor market frictions which, in the model,
are measured by the probability that an agent receives an external wage offer.
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As this probability decreases, firms are more likely to allocate their employees
to informative tasks because they capture part of the benefit of learning their
workers comparative advantage. It follows that agents are less likely to become
entrepreneur to gain task discretion when labor market frictions are high.
A second contribution is therefore to connect the choice between wage work
and entrepreneurship with a well-known observation: that labor market fric-
tions shape the incentives of firms to increase their workers’ productivity, for
example by investing in general human capital (Acemoglu and Pischke, 1999),
or, in our case, by allocating workers to informative tasks. This connection
sheds new light on the relationship between labor market frictions, the mo-
tives for entrepreneurship and the internal organization of firms (in terms of
task discretion). In particular, in the model there is a non-monotonic rela-
tionship between the degree of labor market frictions and the likelihood of
entrepreneurship. When labor market frictions are large, the main effect of
a change in labor market frictions is to decrease the number of individuals
who do not receive wage offers and are forced into entrepreneurship. There-
fore the total number of entrepreneurs decreases when labor market frictions
decrease. Instead, for small labor market frictions, because learning cannot
occur within firms, the leading effect is a change in the number of people who
become entrepreneur to acquire task discretion. Hence, as labor market fric-
tions decrease, less task discretion occurs within firms, fewer agents are hired
by firms and more of them will become entrepreneurs.
These comparative static results are consistent with a rough comparison
of the US and the EU. By most estimates, labor-market frictions in conti-
nental Europe are significantly higher than in the USA.1 Consistent with our
theoretical mechanism, the US has a higher rate of entrepreneurship than the
EU (see, for example, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2015/16 Global
1 Close to our measure of labor frictions, Ridder and Berg (2003) estimate the rate of
arrival of job offers to employed workers for the US, France, UK, Germany and Holland;
they show that, with the exception of the UK, European countries have a rate of job arrival
that is significantly lower than in the US; Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (2005) find a similar
ranking among countries when looking at the arrival rate of job offers to unemployed workers.
2 Relevant Literature 4
Report2) and US firms tend to give less task discretion to their workers than
EU firms. Indeed, according to OECD (2013) the US ranks 14th out of 22 in
terms of task discretion within firms, below most European countries.3
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the
relevant literature. In Section 3 we introduce the model. In Section 4 we derive
conditions under which the choice of task presents a trade off between learning
and short-run profit maximization. We assume that this trade off is present,
and derive the equilibrium of the model in Section 5. In Section 6, we present
additional results relative to wages of entrepreneurs and workers along their
career path and the value of entrepreneurial failures. We conclude in Section
7. Unless otherwise noted, all mathematical derivations are in Appendix A.
In Appendixes B and C we relax some of our assumptions.
2 Relevant Literature
We have borrowed and also contributed to the literature on occupational
choice, learning in the labor market, entrepreneurial failures and incentives
for experimentation.
Co-determination of organizations and occupational choices. Our model
complements those of Hellmann (2007) and De Bettignies and Chemla (2008)
who focus on intellectual protection as a determinant of innovation develop-
ment within or outside firms. When an employee owns his inventions, his
incentive to innovate increases, and with it the incentive to develop this in-
novation as an entrepreneur, outside the firm. The firm’s optimal response
may be to allow the worker to develop the innovation internally as an “in-
trapreneur.” De Bettignies and Chemla (2008) also find that as the return to
entrepreneurship increases, firms become more likely to engage in corporate
2 Available at http://www.gemconsortium.org/report/49480.
3 In this study, the variable task discretion is defined, as in our model, as “Choosing or
changing the sequence of job tasks, the speed of work, working hours; choosing how to do
the job.” The study is available at https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/education/
oecd-skills-outlook-2013_9789264204256-en, see in particular Figure 4.2.
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venturing. We instead focus on labor-market frictions as determinant of both
entrepreneurial activity and firms organizational structure.
Occupational choices and learning comparative advantages. We intro-
duce learning agents’ comparative advantages at different tasks as a driver of
occupational choice. We therefore complement the literature on occupational
choice started by Banerjee and Newman (1993) and Galor and Zeira (1993)
that has considered financial frictions as a key determinant of career choices.
Closer to our focus on learning, a literature initiated by Vereshchagina and
Hopenhayn (2009) studies the choice between wage work and entrepreneur-
ship under the assumption that the return on entrepreneurship is uncertain
but can be learned. Within this literature, Manso (2016) and Dillon and Stan-
ton (2017) show that the instantaneous payoff of entrepreneurs may be lower
than that of comparable workers. This happens because entrepreneurs can al-
ways go back to wage work after having discovered that their entrepreneurial
returns are low, and hence some agents are willing to “try out” entrepreneurship
even if their returns are expected to be low. In our model, instead, agents learn
their comparative advantage at different tasks, and by doing so increase their
productivity at all possible occupations. Hence, by becoming entrepreneurs,
agents do not learn their entrepreneurial ability, but rather they learn their
ability tout court. This has novel empirical implications relative to, for ex-
ample, the wage paid by firms to former entrepreneurs, which could be above
or below that of former workers depending on the severity of labor-market
frictions (see Section 6.1).
Talent discovery in the labor market. In pioneering papers, MacDonald
(1982a,b) analyzes a task-assignment problem with symmetric uncertainty
about talent, a frictionless labor market and employment as the unique oc-
cupation. Gibbons and Waldman (1999) and Gibbons and Waldman (2004)
develop within-firm task assignment models in which there is learning about
an agent’s talent via task allocation, and also task-specific human capital accu-
mulation. Papageorgiou (2013) studies the link between labor-market frictions
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and talent discovery. His model assumes that firms use only one task, hence
cannot choose their internal organization. In his framework, agents must move
between firms to discover their comparative advantage. Hence, as labor-market
frictions increase, mobility decreases and the rate of talent discovery must de-
crease. This is not always true in our model because agents can learn within
firms, and more severe labor-market frictions enhance learning in firms.
Pastorino (2019) estimates a labor market model in which firms gener-
ate information about their workers via task assignment, and measures the
importance of learning relative to human capital accumulation in explaining
cumulative wage growth and wage dispersion. Antonovics and Golan (2012)
address experimentation, defined as choosing a job where the expected prob-
ability of success is low, but where the agent’s type correlates with outcome.
Terviö (2009) argues that cash constraints or the absence of long-term con-
tracting prevent optimal talent discovery, in the sense that jobs will not reveal
productivity of the worker. In Canidio and Gall (2019) the rate of on-the-job
talent discovery depends on the task allocation chosen within firms, which may
be inefficient.
While there are some important connections with all these papers, none of
them allow agents to change occupation, to become entrepreneurs.
Value of failures. It is a common assumption in the economic literature
that failures provide bad news about the expected productivity of an agent.
Prominent examples in the literature on entrepreneurship are Gromb and
Scharfstein (2002) and Landier (2005), who build equilibrium models in which
entrepreneurial failures always produce a stigma, which may be more or less
pronounced depending on some features of the economy. In Gromb and Scharf-
stein (2002), failed entrepreneurs are hired by firms. Because of exogenous
noise, failing in a start-up is not as bad a signal as being fired as a man-
ager, and firms will replace failed managers with failed entrepreneurs. Landier
(2005) shows that when failures are widespread, they reveal little informa-
tion regarding the entrepreneur’s type and hence there is a high level of en-
trepreneurship. When failures are rare, they carry a larger stigma and deters
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entrepreneurship.4
Many business leaders and scholars share Henry Ford’s view that a failure
“is only the opportunity to begin again more intelligently.” For example, the
Harvard Business Review dedicated an entire issues to failures and how they
led to business success (“Failure Chronicles,” April 2011). A recent book by the
journalist Tim Harford, Adapt: Why Success Always Starts with Failure well
summarizes this positive attitude in the business world toward entrepreneurial
failures.
Our model shows how the value of entrepreneurial failures reflects the na-
ture of talent. Talent can be horizontal–different agents have an absolute
advantage at different tasks—or vertical vertical– same agents have an ab-
solute advantage at all tasks. Then, talent can be good news or bad news
depending on the level of labor market frictions only if talent is horizontal. If
instead talent is vertical, failures are always bad news. As we will see, current
evidence provides support to the horizontal view.
Experimentation and incentives. The literature on experimentation and
incentives (Jeitschko and Mirman, 2002; Manso, 2011; Drugov and Macchi-
avello, 2014; Gomes, Gottlieb, and Maestri, 2016) focuses on how to design a
contract that motivates an agent to experiment. By contrast, in our model
the choice of task allocation (and therefore of whether to engage in learning)
rests with the firm. We will therefore study how to design a contract that
motivates a firm to experiment.
Finally, at the core of our model there is a tradeoff between short-run
profit maximization and learning. This tradeoff has been extensively studied
by the literature on multi-arms bandit problems, and is therefore neither new
nor specific to our model. However, this literature typically assumes that the
arms are independent: success and failures at an arm is not informative with
respect to the other arm. Hence, failures always reduce the probability of
future success. This case is therefore equivalent to the vertical talent case.
4 See also Schumacher, Gerling, and Kowalik (2015).
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3 The model
The economy is composed of a finite set of risk-neutral agents and a finite set
of at least two firms that compete for workers. Agents live for two periods
t ∈ {1, 2}, and can be of type θ ∈ {l, h}, where l stands for low and h for high.
Agents’ types are not observable by agents or firms. The common initial belief
about a young agent’s type is pr{θ = h} = p1.
Production and returns. In period t there is an “off-the-shelf” technology
accessible to all firms. Each worker employed in a firm generates a monetary
return Kt when she succeeds and 0 when she fails (this is independent of the
number of workers in the firm.) We assume that Kt is drawn at the beginning
of each period from the uniform distribution on [0, 2], hence that the aggregate
shocks determining Kt are uncorrelated across periods and hence the returns
K1, K2 are independent.
In period t, each agent gets an idea about a project kt. The aggregate
shocks determining Kt also affect an agent’s specific kt, and we assume that
each kt is drawn from the uniform distribution on [0, λKt], where λ ≥ 1.
(Hence, kt is drawn independently over time and across agents.) For instance,
for a given off-the-shelf technology Kt available to firms, some individuals
realize that they can improve on this technology if they leave the firm to
become an entrepreneur (in which case kt > Kt) while others realize that they
will not be able to replicate perfectly the returns that this technology allows
within a firm (in which case kt < Kt). If the agent becomes an entrepreneur,
he can pursue this project and generate a monetary return kt in case of success.
In each period t, an agent can work either in a firm or as an entrepreneur.
In both cases, he can work either on an Advanced task (τt = A) or a Basic
task (τt = B), and may fail (st = 0) or succeed (st = 1). The probability of
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When each agent is assigned to the task at which he is the most likely to
succeed, high types have an advantage over low types:
max(hA, hB) ≥ max(lA, lB). (1)
To avoid trivialities, we assume that individuals have different comparative
advantages, high types being better at the advanced task while low types
being better at basic tasks:6
hA − hB > 0, lB − lA > 0. (2)
For instance, some agents may excel at finding creative solutions to a new
problem but will be unproductive at following strict orders; others flourish
and can be creative in a team environment but will be low performers in isola-
tion. The environment described in (1)-(2) is a discrete version of MacDonald
(1982a,b) and is consistent with two visions of talent.
• (Vertical talent) If hB ≥ lB the probabilities of success at both tasks
are at least as large for type h than type l. Hence types can be ranked
in terms of productivity. High types have an absolute advantage over
low types: they have higher “quality” independently of the task they
5 Note that the specification allows for a task to be uninformative (for instance lB = hB).
In a previous version of the model we considered the possibility of a third type of agent who
is “bad” at all tasks but this extension complicated the analysis without bringing additional
insights (if there is a minimum productivity threshold for an agent to be hired, then some
agents may be unemployable, but otherwise the task allocation problem of employable agents
is the same as in the current specification).
6 If this is not the case, there is a task that maximizes the probability of success of each
type, and no firm or entrepreneur will use the other task since learning has no value for task
allocation.
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are working on. This is the usual interpretation of talent as a vertical
dimension.
• (Horizontal talent) When hB < lB, high type agents have a larger
probability of success only if assigned to the advanced task A. Otherwise,
if assigned to the basic task, a high type agent is in fact less successful
than a low type agent. Talent is horizontal rather than vertical, and
it is not possible to rank types in terms of productivity unless the task
assignment is defined.
Contract offers. We restrict attention to short-term contracts. In every pe-
riod, a contract consists of a fixed payment f and a bonus payment b contingent
on success. We make the following additional assumptions on the contracting
environment.
Assumption 1.
(i) Output is not fully contractible and the bonus is strictly bounded above
by the monetary return of the firm, that is b ≤ βKt where β < 1.
(ii) Task allocations within firms are observable but not contractible.
We interpret the parameter β in (i) as an index of contract completeness.
Within a firm, the value of a success is Kt, but contracts can be contingent
only on βKt. For instance, if the owners of the firm can “run away” and capture
a proportion 1 − β of the monetary return, bonus payments with a share of
monetary returns greater than β are not incentive compatible. Because β < 1
a worker and a firm cannot sign a contract that leaves the firm completely
indifferent between success or failure.
The second part (ii) of the assumption implies that contracts cannot be
made contingent on task allocation. This is consistent with the modern liter-
ature on delegation which emphasizes that ownership restricts the ability not
to interfere with other agents’ decisions, in particular in the context of the
delegation of tasks (Aghion and Tirole, 1997; Baker et al., 1999). Of course,
in a specification of the model with more than two tasks, it may be possible to
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contract over sets of tasks (for example, different sets of task may require dif-
ferent locations, and location may be contractible). Such an extension would
not change our results, provided that the contract has fewer contingencies than
the number of tasks.
Our restrictions to short-term contracts and observable task allocations
simplify the analysis but are not essential. In Appendix B we consider the
case of unobserved task allocation, and show that our results hold in this
case as well. In Appendix C we introduce the possibility of using long-term
contracts. Not surprisingly, long-term contracts improve the value of entering
in an employment relationship. However, they do not eliminate the probability
that an agent becomes an entrepreneur to learn his type. It follows that our
results hold qualitatively in that case as well.
Labor-market frictions. We introduce labor-market frictions in a stark way
by assuming that with probability 1−α an agent receives no offer from firms,
and with probability α he receives at least two offers. This would be the case
for instance if there is a central place where all vacancies are posted and an
agent has access to an imperfect search technology.7
Timing The main differences between the two periods is the possibility of
continuing an employment relationship. In period t = 1, 2, the timing is the
following:
(1) Kt (the same for all firms) and kt (i.i.d. among agents) are realized.
(2) All firms simultaneously offer contracts to all agents.
(3) If t = 1: agents who receive an employment offer choose between en-
trepreneurship and employment. Agents who do not receive an employ-
ment offer become entrepreneurs.
7 Hence there is a zero probability of receiving a single offer. If the probability of an
agent’s receiving a single offer is positive, firms can design their contracts knowing that, with
a small probability, they might have monopsony power over the agent. This significantly
complicates the firm’s problem but does not modify our qualitative results.
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If t = 2: Agents who receive a wage offer choose between entrepreneur-
ship and employment. Former entrepreneurs who do not receive a wage
offer remain entrepreneurs. Former workers who do not receive a wage
offer can continue working for their former employers, in which case the
surplus generated by continuing the employment relationship is split via
Nash bargaining.8
(4) After a contract is signed, the firm chooses the worker’s task. Entrepreneurs
choose their own task.
(5) Outcomes (success or failure) are realized and observed by everybody. In
the case of success, a firm’s output is Kt, while an entrepreneur’s output
is kt.
4 When Learning Conflicts with Short-Term Return
Maximization
In this section we derive conditions under which there is a conflict in period-
1 between the task allocation maximizing the present probability of success
and the task allocation maximizing the future expected probability of success.
These conditions are necessary for a meaningful tradeoff between learning and
short-run profit maximization to emerge. The reader interested in the equi-
librium analysis for occupational choice and wage setting could go directly to
section 5 below.
For any prior belief pt that the individual is of type h, the probability that
there is a success in a given period is:
π(τt, pt) ≡
(1− pt) · lA + pt · hA if τt = A(1− pt) · lB + pt · hB if τt = B.
It follows that the probability of success in the current period is maximized by
8 Nash bargaining is assumed for simplicity. All our results are robust to other assump-
tions, provided that some of the surplus generated by continuing the employment relation-
ship is captured by the firm.
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(1− pt)lB + pthB if pt ≤ q∗(1− pt)lA + pthA if pt ≥ q∗, (4)
that is, the probability of instantaneous success assuming that the agent is
allocated to the task with the largest probability of success. Because period
2 is the last period of the game, in that period both entrepreneurs and firms
choose the task allocation that maximizes the instantaneous probability of
success, and therefore πM(p2) is the equilibrium probability of success in period
2 for given p2.
We define the period-1 probability of success as σ1(τ1) ≡ π(τ1, p1), that is
the probability of instantaneous success at the initial belief p1. Without loss of
generality, we assume that task B is the short-term output maximizing task.
Assumption 2. p1 < q∗: task B maximizes the initial probability of success,
that is σ1(B) > σ1(A).
We are interested in establishing conditions under which τ1 = A maximizes
the period-2 expected probability of success. The posterior belief given a task
allocation τ1 in the first period and whether there is success (s1 = 1) or failure

















if s1 = 0
Comparing two posteriors is therefore equivalent to comparing the likelihood
of facing a high type: for instance, p2(τ1, 1) > p2(τ1, 0) if, and only if, the
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From period 1’s point of view, choosing task τ1 yields in period 2 an ex-
pected probability of success equal to:
σ2(τ1) ≡ Es1∈{0,1}πM(p2(τ1, s1)),
The next propositions provide conditions under which A is (strictly) more
informative than B, that is σ2(A) > σ2(B).
Proposition 1. In the vertical talent case there is a conflict between maxi-










In the horizontal talent case there is a conflict between maximizing today’s









and hA − lA > lB · hA − lA · hB > lB − hB.
Note that the above proposition provides necessary and sufficient condi-
tions for the vertical talent case, but only sufficient conditions for the hori-
zontal talent case. We give in Proposition 4 in the Appendix the necessary
and sufficient conditions for σ2(A) > σ2(B) for the horizontal talent case. Fig-
ure 1 below illustrates a typical tradeoff between period-1 opportunity cost
σ1(B)− σ1(A) and period-2 gain σ2(A)− σ2(B) from choosing τ1 = A instead
of τ1 = B.9
Having established the possibility of a conflict in period 1 between in-
stantaneous success and learning, we now analyze how this conflict influences
career choices and returns from these choices. We will take as given that
σ1(A) < σ1(B) and that σ2(A) > σ2(B).
9 The units have been rescaled; the intersection of the two curves is at p < 5/11, that is
when task B is always chosen in the second period if task B is chosen in the first period.
Horizontal talent leads to similar looking curves.





q∗ = 1/2= 4/11
σ1(B)− σ1(A)
Fig. 1: Vertical talent example: hA = 0.7; hB = 0.6; lB = 0.5; lA = 0.4
5 Equilibrium Analysis
In the first subsection we derive the lifetime value of starting a career as a
worker or as an entrepreneurs, as a function of k1, K1 and α. In the next
subsection, we solve for the choice of occupation, taking into account that
some agents may not receive wage offers.
5.1 Value Functions
Period 2 payoffs. In period 2, if an agent accepts a job offer he earns the full
expected return of the firms’ project,10 which implies that the choice of becom-
ing an entrepreneur or employee depends on what project is more valuable.
Hence, from period-1 point of view, the expected period-2 payoff conditional
on receiving an employment offer (which happens with probability α) is11









Note that the above expression depends on period-1 task allocation via the
probability of period-2 success.
When an agent does not receive offers (which happens with probability
1 − α), his period-2 payoff depends not only on his period-1 task allocation
10 Because period 2 is the last period of the game, firms and workers have the same
preferences over task allocation: they prefer the task allocation that maximizes period-2
output. Hence, the exact structure of a period-2 contract (that is, what part is paid as
bonus b and what part is paid as fixed wage f) is not relevant.
11 The calculations omitted from the text are in Appendix, page 39.
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but also on his period-1 occupation. A period-1 entrepreneur remains an
entrepreneur in period-2 whenever he does not receive a wage offer in period-
2, and therefore earns k2 in case of success. Hence, the expected period-2
payoff of a period-1 entrepreneur is:













which is increasing in α. Instead, a period-1 employee who does not receive
wage offers can continue working for his period-1 employer. In this case, the
agent and his period-1 employer need to split a surplus given by the difference
between the value of continuing the employment relationship and the value of
entrepreneurship, that is σ2(τ1)max{K2− k2, 0}, where E[max{K2− k2, 0}] =
1
2λ












These profits are decreasing in α and, crucially, for α < 1 are larger when
τ1 = A than when τ1 = B. That is, because of labor market frictions, in
period 2 firms may be able to earn part of the benefit of learning their workers’
talent. Similarly, from period 1 point of view, the expected period-2 payoff of
a period-1 worker is:
σ2(τ1)
(




















We now compute to value of choosing a given occupation in period-1 by solving
for the optimal period-1 task allocation.
Lifetime utility of a period-1 entrepreneur. The expected period-1 payoff
of an entrepreneur is σ1(τ1) · k1. Hence, task τ1 generates an expected return
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An entrepreneur chooses τ1 = A whenever






That is, the entrepreneur will favor learning over short-run profits whenever
the current value of a success is low relative to the future expected value of
a success. Higher labor market frictions (i.e., lower α) reduce the probability
that the agent will receive a wage offer and that he will work for a firm when
K2 > k2. Hence, from the point of view of period-1, as labor-market frictions
become more severe the value of a period-2 success decreases, learning becomes
less valuable, and the entrepreneur is more likely to choose task B.









if k1 > kA(α),
which is continuous and strictly increasing in both arguments.






This expression is also equivalent to the total output generated by an en-
trepreneur with project k1 = K1 in the absence of labor market frictions (that
is, when α = 1). It follows that the two period total output generated within
firms is maximized by task A if, and only if, K1 ≤ kA(1), where kA(1) is
defined in (5).
However, the output maximizing task allocation may not be incentive com-
patible. Remember that firms earn zero profits in equilibrium and therefore
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the period-2 profits that a period-1 employer expects to earn in case its em-
ployee does not receive an outside wage offer are factored into the period-1
contract offered to the worker. However these period-2 profits are relevant
in deriving the period-1 task allocation. After a contract (f, b) is signed in
period 1, the fixed component f is sunk and the determinants of the optimal
task choice are the bonus b and the expected period-2 profits. Choosing task
A generates a period-1 opportunity cost equal to (σ1(B) − σ1(A))(K − b), a
decreasing function of b. By contrast the future benefit of choosing task A in
the first period is (σ2(A)− σ2(B))1−α4λ , that is the expected value of the share
of surplus accruing to the firm in case its worker does not receive a wage offer.
Because, by assumption, the largest possible bonus b is b = βK1, the firm
can commit to implement task A in the first period if (σ1(B) − σ1(A))(1 −
β)K1 ≤ (σ2(A)− σ2(B))1−α4λ , that is when






Since the smallest possible bonus is zero, the firm can commit to implement
task B if (σ1(B)− σ1(A))K1 ≥ (σ2(A)− σ2(B))1−α4λ , that is when






Clearly, for any α, KB(α) < kA(1) and the firm can always implement task B
whenever it is output maximizing to do so.
A sufficiently large bonus b, therefore, serves as a commitment to implement
the most informative task (task A). The observation that larger bonuses can
generate more learning contrasts with that of Manso (2011) who argues that a
principal may motivate a worker to experiment by paying a fixed wage initially
and a large bonus for success far in the future. The reason for this contrast
is that in Manso (2011) the choice of learning rests with the worker while in
our model the choice of learning via task allocation rests with the firm. Hence
if a large bonus is paid to the worker, the firm’s payoff is less sensitive to
the realization of failures and success and therefore the firm is more likely to
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choose the learning-maximizing task allocation.
Competition for workers among firms allows us to reduce the firm’s problem
to the choice of a task τ1 that maximizes the two-period total output subject
to the incentive compatibility constraints, that is:





τ1 = A⇒ K1 ≤ KA(α).
By observing that the incentive compatibility constraint is binding if and
only if KA(α) < kA(1) we arrive at the following lemma:
Lemma 1. (i) In a competitive equilibrium, firms choose contracts that im-




and task τ1 = B
otherwise.
(ii) Whenever K1 ≥ kA(1) or K1 ≤ KA(α) the equilibrium task allocation




the firm’s task allocation is inefficient: the two-period total output is
maximized by τ1 = A but firms implement τ1 = B.
Proof. In the text.
Figure 2 provides a graphical illustration of the lemma. If α is sufficiently
low, then for a given K1 the firm allocates the worker to the task that maxi-
mizes the two-period total output. In particular, the firm sets τ1 = A whenever
K1 is below kA(1) and τ1 = B otherwise. If instead α is high, there is a range
of K1 for which it would be optimal to implement τ1 = A, but no contract can
achieve it. In this case, for low K1 the firm maximizes the two-period total
output by setting τ1 = A, for high K1 the firm maximizes two-period total
output by setting τ1 = B, for intermediate K1 the firm sets τ1 = B despite
the fact that τ1 = A generates higher two-period total output. For every α,
the size of this last region depends on the degree of contract incompleteness β.
In particular, for higher β (i.e., a large fraction of output is contractible) the
firm is able to pay larger bonuses, and is therefore more likely to maximize the





Allocate the worker to task τ1 = A
Allocate the worker to task τ1 = B
Fig. 2: Period 1 task allocation within firms.
two-period total output. The opposite holds for low β (i.e., a large fraction of
output not contractible).
Hence, the inability of firms to commit to a task allocation makes them
short-termists when K1 ∈ (KA(α), kA(1)), which is more likely to happen
when labor market frictions are low (i.e., α is high). When there are no
labor market frictions (α = 1), firms always implement the short-run output
maximizing task allocation, and learning cannot occur within firms.
5.2 Equilibrium Occupational Choices
Having derived the value of being a period-1 worker or a period-1 entrepreneur,
we now close the model by solving for the optimal period-1 occupational choice.
In period 1, a fraction 1 − α of agents do not receive a wage offer and
therefore become entrepreneurs. We call these agents necessity entrepreneurs.
The agents who receive a wage offer will choose their occupation by comparing
the two period payoff earned as an entrepreneur with two period payoff earned
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as a worker. Figure 3 plots these payoffs as a function of K1 and k1 when α
is small and large; the red arrows indicate the change in the curves when α
increases.
K1, k1







(a) Low α: KA(α) > kA(1)
K1, k1







(b) High α: KA(α) < kA(1)
Fig. 3: Payoffs and labor market frictions.
The discontinuity inW F (K1, α) for high values of α illustrates the incentive
problem faced by the firm in choosing task allocation. As α increases workers
are more likely to receive competing offers, and firms will assign workers more
often (that is for a large set of K1) to the basic task. This assignment is
inefficient for K1 < kA(1) but maximizes short-run profits. The discontinuity
arises at KA(α), which is the value of K1 at which the firm is indifferent
between assigning the worker to either task. At this cutoff the firm can credibly
commit to assign the worker to the advanced task, leading to an upward jump
in the value of working for a firm whenever the advanced task is the efficient
one, that is, at K1 = KA(α). Because KA(α) is decreasing in α, the expected
two-period payoff from employment also decreases in α. At the same time,
WE(k1, α) increases with α. Therefore, ceteris paribus as α increases agents
are more likely to choose entrepreneurship when they obtain a wage offer.
Formally, an agent who receives a wage offer will become an entrepreneur
whenever
WE(k1, α) ≥ W F (K1, α)
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We denote by kE(K1, α) the project value k1 leaving an agent indifferent be-
tween becoming an entrepreneur and working for a firm:
kE(K1, α) ≡ k1 solution to WE(k1, α) = W F (K1, α).
Note that the payoff earned from working for a firm can be rewritten as:














K1 ∈ [KA(α), kA(1)]
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that is, total output assuming that the task allocation implemented within
firms is optimal, minus a loss whenever learning cannot occur within firms,
which is realized whenever K1 ∈ [KA(α), kA(1)]. Given this, we can categorize
the mass of agents who become entrepreneurs after receiving a wage offer into
two groups:
• Opportunity entrepreneurs : These agents prefer entrepreneurship to work-
ing for a firm for any task they may be allocated to within the firm. In
other words, these agents have a project value k1 larger than








where the RHS is the maximum two period output generated within a
firm. Note that, by definition, kO(K1, α) is decreasing in α and increasing
in K1. Furthermore kO(α,K1) > K1 for α < 1 and kO(α,K1) = K1 for
α = 1. Hence, opportunity entrepreneurs always work on projects of
value higher of that of firms.
• Learning entrepreneurs : those for which k1 ∈ [kE(K1, α), kO(K1, α)].
These agents become entrepreneurs because firms implement task τ1 = B
despite the fact that task τ1 = Amaximizes the two period output. These
entrepreneurs will implement task τ1 = A. In other words, these agents
become entrepreneurs to choose the learning-maximizing task whenever
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this cannot happen within firms.
We can therefore decompose the probability of becoming an entrepreneur
in period 1 into three elements corresponding to the three motives:
PE1 (α) ≡ (1− α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
necessity
+α · pr{k1 > kO(K1, α)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
opportunity
+α · pr{kE(K1, α) < k1 < kO(K1, α)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
learning
= 1− α + α · pr{k1 > kE(K1, α)}.
Whenever α is sufficiently low KA(α) > kA(1) and the task allocation
within firms is optimal; therefore there are no learning entrepreneurs. This is
apparent from the left panel in Figure 3 since for any value of K1, individ-
uals who become entrepreneurs while receiving offers are more likely to use
the basic task. Instead, whenever α is sufficiently high KA(α) < kA(1) and
the task allocation within firms may not be optimal; in this case, there is a
positive probability of being a learning entrepreneur. For instance, in the right
panel of Figure 3, at the intersection of W F and WE (that is, when the agent
gets the same project as the firm) he will choose task A as an entrepreneur
while the firm would choose task B. Similarly, the probability of becoming an
opportunity entrepreneur is zero whenever kO(K1, α) > λK1 which happens
whenever either λ or α is sufficiently low, and is strictly positive otherwise.
The level of labor market frictions therefore affects both the probability
of becoming an entrepreneur in period 1, and the importance of the different
motives for entrepreneurship. This is illustrated by Figure 4, in which we re-
port a numerical simulation. Note that the learning motive becomes relatively
more important with respect to the other motives when α is large, generating
in this simulation a U-shape relationship between α and the probability of
becoming an entrepreneur in period 1. The following lemma shows that, in
general, there is a non-monotonic relationship between labor market frictions
and the probability of becoming an entrepreneur: as α is close to zero, the first
order effect is the decrease in necessity entrepreneurs while when α is close to
1 the first order effect is the increase in learning entrepreneurs.
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Fig. 4: Motives for Entrepreneurship as a function of α (β = 0.9, λ = 1.5,
p = 0.45, hA = 0.9, lA = 0.1, hB = 0.4, lB = 0.6)
Lemma 2. The probability of first period entrepreneurs PE1 (α) is decreasing
for α close to 0 and increasing for α close to 1.
In period 2, instead there is no value of learning and hence there are no
“learning entrepreneurs”. All those who previously worked for a firm become
entrepreneurs if k2 > K2 and continue working for a firm otherwise. Similarly,
all former entrepreneurs who receive a wage offer choose entrepreneurship if
and only if k2 > K2. Instead, former entrepreneurs who do not receive a wage
offer are again entrepreneurs. The probability of becoming an entrepreneur in
period 2 is therefore:
PE2 (α) ≡ (1− α)PE1 (α) + (1− (1− α)PE1 (α))pr{k2 > K2}
= (1− α)PE1 (α)(1− pr{k2 > K2}) + pr{k2 > K2}
Having derived PE1 (α) and PE2 (α), we can now compute two commonly
used measures of aggregate entrepreneurial activity: the probability of being
a serial entrepreneur and the average probability of becoming an entrepreneur
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across periods.12 The probability of being a serial entrepreneur (that is, an
entrepreneur in both periods) is
PEserial(α) ≡ P
E
1 (α) · (1− α + α · pr{k2 > K2}),













PE1 (α)(1 + (1− α)(1− pr{k2 > K2})) + pr{k2 > K2}
)
.
As the next proposition shows, if the learning motive for entrepreneurship
is sufficiently strong, entrepreneurial activity increases in α. This implies
the rather surprising result that, as labor market frictions are reduced, fewer
people become workers.
Proposition 2. PEserial(α) and P
E
(1/2)(α) are decreasing for α close to 0, and







The LHS of the above expression measures the value of learning one com-
parative advantage relative to its cost. On the RHS, β measures the firm’s
ability to internalize the benefit of learning. When either σ2(A)−σ2(B)
σ1(B)−σ1(A) or β is
large, a small amount of labor market frictions allow firms to internalize the
benefit of learning. However, as labor market frictions disappear, learning
cannot happen within firms. It follows that under (7) the fraction of learning
entrepreneurs reacts very rapidly to changes in α, therefore determining the
shape of PEserial(α), and P
E
(1/2)(α).
Using the same parameter values as in Figure 4, a simulation shows indeed
a non-monotonic relationship between α and these two aggregate measures of
entrepreneurship (see Figure 5).
12 In an overlapping generation extension of the model, P(1/2) is the probability that, at
any given moment in time an agent is an entrepreneur.
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Fig. 5: Serial and Time Average Probabilities of Entrepreneurship as a function
of α. (β = 0.9, λ = 1.5, p = 0.45, hA = 0.9, lA = 0.1, hB = 0.4,
lB = 0.6)
6 Additional Implications
6.1 Wages of Past Workers and Past Entrepreneurs
As already discussed in the literature review, our model generates novel pre-
dictions with respect to the wage of former workers relative to the wage of
former entrepreneurs who change occupation. As we established in section 5,
as α changes, the task allocations of workers and of entrepreneurs change in
opposite directions. As α increases, workers are more likely to be allocated
to task τ = B while entrepreneurs are more likely to choose task τ = A. In
the limit case of α = 1 all workers are allocated to τ = B and a positive
mass of entrepreneurs (the learning entrepreneurs) chooses instead task A. It
follows, therefore, that for α sufficiently large the period 2 wage of a former
entrepreneur is greater than the period-2 wage of a former worker.
On the other hand, when KA(α) ≥ kA(1) (i.e., the task allocation within
firms is efficient), workers learn more than entrepreneurs in period 1. The next
lemma shows that this condition is equivalent to α being small enough.
6 Additional Implications 27
Lemma 3. For α ≤ 1 − 2(1 + λ2)(1 − β), workers are more likely than en-
trepreneurs to work on task A in period 1.
It follows that, when α ≤ 1 − 2(1 + λ2)(1 − β), the period-2 wage of former
workers who receive a wage offer is larger than that of former entrepreneurs.
Of course, the average wage of former workers also depends on the payoff of
former workers who did not receive an outside offer. However, the above lemma
shows that if β is large (i.e. degree of contract incompleteness is low) even a
small degree of labor market frictions can induce an efficient task allocation
within firms. In this case, there exist values of α such that workers are more
likely than entrepreneurs to work on task A, and at the same time the fraction
of period-1 workers who do not receive a wage offer is low. For those values of
α, on average, former entrepreneurs receive lower wages compared to former
workers of equivalent characteristics.
There are unfortunately few empirical analysis relative to the compensa-
tions of former entrepreneurs who change occupation. Nevertheless, our results
are consistent with the existing empirical evidence. Hamilton (2000) shows
that US entrepreneurs who leave entrepreneurship and re-enter the labor mar-
ket after some years earn higher wages than comparable workers: the median
entrepreneur returning to paid employment after 10 years as an entrepreneur
earns a wage that is 15% higher than a comparable worker who never left
employment.13 Our model suggests an opposite result for high labor market
friction economies (the wage of former entrepreneurs is lower than the wage of
workers who have never left employment) which is consistent with the finding
in Baptista, Lima, and Preto (2012) for Portugal.14
13 See Table 6 and the discussion on pages 625-626 of Hamilton (2000). Hamilton notes
that this result is consistent with the findings of Evans and Leighton (1990). See also Daly
(2015) for similar results.
14 Neither Hamilton (2000) nor Baptista, Lima, and Preto (2012) discuss why an agent
will leave entrepreneurship.
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6.2 The Value of Failures
A failure can be beneficial to an agent if it allows a better allocation of talent
in the next period. As we will show shortly, failures have this property only if
the agent has worked on the advanced task and if talent is horizontal.
Figure 6 illustrates how the maximum probability of success πM(pt) varies
as a function of the belief that the agent is a high type.15 As is apparent,
when talent is vertical, the success probability is monotonically increasing,
but if instead talent is horizontal, the success probability is non monotonic.
That is, being a l type for sure is better than being uncertain about whether





















(b) Horizontal case: hB < lB
Fig. 6: Maximum probability of success as a function of belief pt.
Remember from Section 4 that when talent is vertical, failures reduce the
probability of being a h type (more so when the failure is at task A) since h
types are more likely to succeed than l types at any task. Hence, when talent
is vertical failures are always bad news because they decrease the probability
of success in period 2 relative to the initial probability of success, that is:
πM(p2(τ1, 0)) < π
M(p1) for all τ1 ∈ {A,B}.
15 This probability is obtained by allocating an agent to the task with the highest proba-
bility of success, see Equation 4 for the formal definition.
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In the horizontal talent case, instead, failures at task A increase the probability
that the agent is a low type. By Assumption 2, such failures are good news
because they lead to an increase of the future probability of success (relative to
no history). Instead, failures at task B increase the probability that the agent
is of type h, and may be good or bad news depending on the prior belief p1: if
p1 is sufficiently close to q∗ failures at task B are also good news; if instead p1
is sufficiently low (for example, p1 such that πM(p2(B, 0)) < q), then failures
at task B are bad news. The following Lemma formalizes these observations.
Lemma 4. (i) In the vertical-talent case failures are always bad news, that
is, πM(p2(τ1, 0)) < πM(p1) for all τ1 ∈ {A,B}.
(ii) In the horizontal-talent case, failures at task A are always good news, that
is, πM(p2(A, 0)) > πM(p1). There is a threshold qB such that failures at
task B are bad news for p1 < qB and good news for p1 > qB.
The vertical view of talent implies that failures should reduce the proba-
bility of a future success. Instead, when talent is horizontal, failures can be
“good news” depending on the task allocation. In this case, if labor market
frictions are low (i.e., high α) and the majority of entrepreneurs are learning
entrepreneurs (i.e., λ low), entrepreneurs will choose τ1 = A and a failure at
this task leads to an increase in the future probability of success. This moti-
vates the following proposition that relates the degree of labor market friction
to the value of failures.
Proposition 3. For a serial entrepreneur, the probability of succeeding as an
entrepreneur in period 2 is increasing in α. Furthermore
(i) If talent is vertical, failures are always “bad news”. That is, the probability
of succeeding in period 2 as an entrepreneur following an entrepreneurial
failure in period 1 is below the initial probability of success σ1(B) for all
α.
(ii) If talent is horizontal, there exist parameter values such that failures are
good news for α sufficiently high, and bad news for α sufficiently low.
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With respect to the existing evidence, in the US entrepreneurial failures
seem to lead to entrepreneurial success. For example, Gompers, Kovner,
Lerner, and Scharfstein (2010) show that entrepreneurs who previously failed
are marginally more likely to succeed than first time entrepreneurs. Again
the evidence available for Europe tells a very different story. Using German
data, Gottschalk, Greene, Höwer, and Müller (2014) show that entrepreneurs
who have previously failed are subsequently more likely to fail than first time
entrepreneurs. Our model explains these different values of failure if talent
is horizontal : different agents have an absolute advantage at different tasks.
Instead, when talent is vertical (that is, the same agent has an absolute ad-
vantage at all tasks) failures are always bad news, independently of the level
of labor market frictions, a finding which seems counterfactual.
6.3 Age profile of entrepreneurs
At α = 1, there are no necessity entrepreneurs. Furthermore, both old and
young agents become opportunity entrepreneurs whenever kt > Kt, which
implies that there is the same number of old and young opportunity en-
trepreneurs. Learning entrepreneurs, however, exist only in period 1. By
continuity, therefore, for α sufficiently large young agents are more likely than
old agents to become entrepreneurs.
For lower values of α, however, other effects come into play. For example,
young agents anticipate that, if they become entrepreneurs, they may not be
able to find a job in the future. This concern is absent for old agents, which
implies that there are more old opportunity entrepreneurs than young oppor-
tunity entrepreneurs. It is therefore possible that, for some intermediate α,
old people are more likely to be entrepreneurs than young people. Simulations
show that this is indeed a possibility.
We are not aware of any evidence linking the effect of age on the proba-
bility of becoming an entrepreneur with the degree of labor market friction.
A recent paper (Azoulay, Jones, Kim, and Miranda, forthcoming) shows that
old entrepreneurs are more likely to succeed than young entrepreneurs. This
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is consistent with the model, because experience generates learning (indepen-
dently from an agent occupation or task allocation), which can then be used
in the choice of task allocation.
6.4 Output
In period 1 a fraction 1−α of the population will not receive a wage offer and
is forced into entrepreneurship, while a fraction α of the population chooses
entrepreneurship or wage work depending on the two period output generated
by these two options. Hence, the two-period total expected output in the
economy is






Therefore, for a fixed W F (k1, α), total expected output increases with α both
because fewer agents become necessity entrepreneurs, and because E[WE(k1, α)]
increases with α. At the same time,W F (k1, α) is decreasing with α, because as
α approaches 1 firms are unable to implement the two-period output maximiz-
ing task allocation. It is theoretically possible that total output is decreasing
over some range of α.16 However, our numerical simulations suggest that out-
put is an increasing function of α for most values of β, λ, p, hA, lA, hB and
lB.
The model helps clarify how a specific realization of the aggregate shockK1
affects the incentive of firms to learn, the number and motives of entrepreneurs,
and total output. A key observation is that the value of working for a firm
W F (K1, α) is discontinuous atK1 = KA(α) when α is large. Therefore, a small
decrease in K1 from above KA(α) to below KA(α) will cause a reallocation of
workers from task B (the inefficient task allocation) to task A (the efficient
task allocation), leading to the following corollaries:
16 For example, if β is large, a small amount of labor market frictions is sufficient to induce
the efficient task allocation within firms. In this case, for α close to 1 the task allocation
within firms is efficient while for α = 1 it is not, and therefore output increases in α for α
close to 1.
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• Period-1 output decreases by more than the change in K1. The reason
is the change in period-1 allocation from τ1 = B to τ1 = A, that is from
the task with the highest probability of success in period 1 to the task
with the lowest probability of success in period 1.
• The number of period-1 entrepreneurs decreases, because the learning
motive for entrepreneurship disappears.
• Period-2 output generated within firms increases because period-1 work-
ers are now allocated to the learning-maximizing task allocation.
• Total two-period expected output also increases. There are two causes
for this increase. The drop in K1 from above KA(α) to below KA(α)
generates an upward jump in W F (K1, α), that is, in the sum of the two-
period outputs produced within firms. At the same time, more agents
in period 1 will choose to work for a firm rather than becoming an
entrepreneur.
Therefore, although K1 and k1 are independent from K2 and k2, the aggregate
shock realized in period 1 has long term implications for future output because
it determines firms’ incentives to learn.
Instead, for α low W F (K1, α) is continuous and the task allocation im-
plemented within firms maximizes two-period output. Here, total two-period
output is monotonic in K1.
7 Conclusion
Ceteris-paribus, the intensity of labor-market frictions determines the propor-
tion of different types of entrepreneurs in the economy, the relative wages of
former entrepreneurs and former workers, and the probability of becoming an
entrepreneur. By focusing on labor market frictions, our model provides a set
of results that are consistent with evidence both for the US and for the EU,
which are examples of low and high labor market frictions.
In order to focus on the learning motive for entrepreneurship, we have
ignored other important determinants of entrepreneurial activity, such as fi-
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nancial constraints, skill acquisition, learning by doing, or differential ability
of agents to become entrepreneurs.
In our model, when entrepreneurs face financial constraints, the effect of la-
bor market frictions on entrepreneurial activity will be stronger. Indeed, if the
labor market is frictionless, firms’ competition insures that workers are able
to appropriate the full benefit of learning. Hence firms adopt a less informa-
tive task allocation independently of the importance of financial constraints.
However, when there are labor-market frictions, financial constraints limit the
exit of workers into entrepreneurship and therefore increase the ability of firms
to appropriate the benefit of learning.17 Hence, labor-market frictions and fi-
nancial constraints are complementary since they increase the likelihood that
learning will occur within firms.
There is an element of learning by doing in our model because agents
acquire information about their comparative advantage, are better able to
match their talent to a task, and therefore increase their productivity over
time. We do not however allow agents to increase their productivity on a given
task by simply working on that task, that is, there is no task-specific human
capital (see Gibbons and Waldman, 1999 and Gibbons and Waldman, 2004).
Our results stand as long as this increase in productivity is small compared to
the benefit of learning one’s comparative advantage.
We have assumed that the production process involves only one task. By
contrast, Lazear (2004) assumes that workers work at a single task while en-
trepreneurs work at multiple tasks and he shows, both theoretically and em-
pirically, that people with a more balanced skill set enter entrepreneurship.
Åstebro, Chen, and Thompson (2011), building on Lazear (2004), propose a
model in which agents choose between self-employment (in which case they
work on multiple tasks) and wage work (in which case they are allocate to
a specific task). Exogenous frictions prevent both the efficient assignment of
agents to firms, and also the efficient assignment of workers to tasks. These
17 On the role of financial constraints, see Hellmann (2007), who shows that cash con-
straints shape the way ideas are financed, within or outside the firm, and Terviö (2009),
who argues that, absent long-term contracts, financial constrains may prevent optimal talent
discovery in firms.
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frictions are the reason why some agents may become self employed. Both in
Lazear (2004) and Åstebro et al. (2011) agents’ productivity at different tasks
are perfectly known, and hence there is no learning. This implies that, for
example, these models do not make predictions with respect to the wage of
former entrepreneurs. It would be interesting to add uncertainty about tal-
ent to Lazear’s framework, and study if and how learning determines agents’
occupational choices. This extension is left for future work.
Finally, one may be tempted to interpret the case of high labor market fric-
tions as illustrative of developing countries, and there is indeed ample evidence
that many people living in developing countries are “reluctant” entrepreneurs
(Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). However, we refrain from this temptation. We use
the model to explore the effect of labor market frictions keeping everything else
constant. This may be a reasonable way to proceed when comparing countries
(such as the US and European countries) that have different levels of labor
market frictions but are otherwise similar in their contracting abilities, the
development of their financial markets, and their level of human capital. But
this is hardly the case for developing countries. These other dimensions are
not part of our model but are likely to affect the type, frequency and market
rewards of entrepreneurial ventures in developing countries.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Necessary condition for informativeness. Independently of the task as-
signment in the first period, Bayesian updating implies that
Es1∈{0,1}π(τ1, p2(τ1, s1))p2(τ1, s1) = p1. (8)
Because of Assumption 2, there is a realization of s1 such that the posterior
p2(τ1, s1) is inferior to q∗, leading to task B being adopted in period 2. Since
the expected probability of success πM(pt) is linear when p ≤ q∗, a necessary
condition for A to be more informative than B is that maxs1 p2(A, s1) > q∗.
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posterior following task A is achieved following a success. More informative-
ness of A therefore requires that p2(A, 1) > q∗, that is









Sufficient condition for (weak) informativeness. Since the maximum prob-
ability of success is a convex function of the posterior, whenever the distribu-
tion of posteriors following τ1 = A is a mean preserving spread of the distribu-
tion of the distribution following τ1 = B, we will have σ2(A) ≥ σ2(B). Using
our previous remark that maxs1 p2(A, s1) = p2(A, 1), the distribution of pos-




p2(B, s1) < p1 < max
s1
p2(B, s1) < p2(A, 1). (MPS)
Under the above condition, σ2(A) = σ2(B) if and only if p1 ≤ qA, that is if
and only if no matter the task allocation and the realization of success and
failure in period 1 the agent is always allocated to task B in period 2. Hence,
(MPS) and p1 > qA are sufficient for σ2(A) > σ2(B).
When talent is vertical, hA > hB > lB > lA, and the posteriors are ordered
as
p2(A, 0) < p2(B, 0) < p1 < p2(B, 1) < p2(A, 1).
and (MPS) is automatically satisfied.
When talent is horizontal, lB > hB implies that
p2(B, 1) < p1 < p2(B, 0) and p2(A, 0) < p1 < p2(A, 1),
but not necessarily (MPS). The distribution of posteriors following A is a
mean preserving spread of the distribution of posterior following B whenever
p2(A, 1) > p2(B, 0) and p2(A, 0) < p2(B, 1). Simple algebra shows that these
conditions are equivalent to hA−lA > lBhA−lAhB > lB−hB, which is therefore
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sufficient for σ1(A) < σ1(B) but σ2(A) > σ2(B) in the horizontal case.
Generalization of Proposition 1
Proposition 1 only provides sufficient conditions for σ1(A) < σ1(B) but σ2(A) >
σ2(B) in the horizontal case. Here we instead provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for σ1(A) < σ1(B) but σ2(A) > σ2(B) in the horizontal case.
Proposition 4. Under assumption 2, in the horizontal talent case there is a
conflict between today’s probability of success and tomorrow’s if and only if




















































1− (hA + hB)
1− (lA + lB)
)−1
.
Proof. We already argued in the body of the text that









is a necessary condition for σ2(A) > σ2(B). Note that this condition is consis-
tent with p1 < p? because hA > lA and therefore qA < q∗.
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then p2(A, 0) < p2(B, 1) < p1 in the horizontal talent case, and p2(A, 0) <







then p1 < p2(B, 0) < p2(A, 1) in the horizontal talent case, and p1 < p2(B, 1) <
p2(A, 1) in the vertical talent case. Hence, whenever (11) and (12) hold the
distribution of posteriors if τ1 = A is a mean-preserving spread of the distri-
bution of posteriors if τ1 = B, and we are in the case considered in the body
of the text. Conditions (11) and (12) always hold when talent is vertical (i.e.,
lB ≥ hB), but may not hold when talent is horizontal. For the horizontal
talent case, therefore, we need to consider few additional cases.
Horizontal talent, both (11) and (12) are violated. In this case p2(B, 1) <
p2(A, 0) < p1 < p2(A, 1) < p2(B, 0). The distribution of posteriors if τ1 = B
is a mean-preserving spread of the distribution of posteriors if τ1 = A, and
τ1 = A generates less learning and a lower probability of success in period 2
than τ1 = B.
Horizontal talent, (12) holds but (11) is violated. In this case p2(B, 1) <
p2(A, 0) < p1 < p2(B, 0) < p2(A, 1). Hence, if p2(B, 0) < q∗, task B is not
informative, because both in case of success and failures the period-2 task
allocation will again be B. Hence, condition (10) is sufficient for learning to











Note that, by 12, qA < qoo < q∗. Hence, τ1 = A generates more learning and
a higher probability of success in period 2 if qA < p1 < qoo.
For qoo < p1 < q∗, p2(B, 0) > q∗. That is, following a failure at task B the
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agent is allocated to task A in period 2. It follows that
σ2(A) = p1h
2
A + (1− p1)l2A + p1(1− hA)hB + (1− p1)(1− lA)lB if p1 > qoo
σ2(B) = p1h
2
B + (1− p1)l2B + p1(1− hB)hA + (1− p1)(1− lB)lA if p1 > qoo
and therefore:
σ2(A)−σ2(B) = (1−p1)(lB−lA)(1−(lB+lA))−p1(hA−hB)(1−(hA+hB)) if p1 > qoo.
(13)
There are few subcases to consider:
• Whenever hA + hB > 1 and lB + lA < 1, then 13 is always positive.
However, this case is incompatible with (11) being violated.
• Whenever hA+hB < 1 and lB+lA > 1, (13) is always negative. However,
hA + hB < 1 and lB + lA > 1 is incompatible with (12).







1− (hA + hB)
1− (lA + lB)
)−1
,




, so that qooo > qoo.
Furthermore, qooo < q∗ if and only if lA + lB > hA + hB. Hence, when
(12) holds, (11) is violated, hA+hB < lB+ lA < 1, we have that σ2(A) >
σ2(B) if and only if qA < p1 < qooo. When (12) holds, (11) is violated,
lB+lA < hA+hB < 1, we have that σ2(A) > σ2(B) if and only if qA < p1.







1− (hA + hB)
1− (lA + lB)
)−1
,




, so that qooo < qoo.
Hence, when (12) holds, (11) is violated, lB + lA > 1 and hA + hB > 1,
we have that σ2(A) > σ2(B) if and only if p1 > qA.
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Horizontal talent, (12) is violated but (11) holds. In this case p2(A, 0) <
p2(B, 1) < p1 < p2(A, 1) < p2(B, 0). Hence, if p2(A, 1) > q∗, then also
p2(B, 0) > q
∗. For any p1 > q, the difference between σ2(A) and σ2(B) is
again given by (13). Going through the same subcases, we get
• Whenever hA + hB > 1 and lB + lA < 1, then 13 is always positive.
However, this case is incompatible with (12) being violated.
• Whenever hA+hB < 1 and lB+lA > 1, (13) is always negative. However,
hA + hB < 1 and lB + lA > 1 is incompatible with (11).







1− (hA + hB)
1− (lA + lB)
)−1
,
In this case, the fact that (12) is violated imply qooo < qA. Hence this
condition never leads to σ2(A) > σ2(B).







1− (hA + hB)
1− (lA + lB)
)−1
,
In this case, the fact that (12) is violated imply qooo > qA. Note also
that qooo < q∗ if and only if lA + lB < hA + hB. Hence, when (11) holds,
(12) is violated, 1 < lA + lB < hA + hB > 1 we have that σ2(A) > σ2(B)
if and only if p1 > qooo.
Omitted calculations relative to Section 5
For the reader’s convenience, we report here all the calculations relative to
Section 5:




























































































































Proof of Lemma 2
Because W F (K1, α) is discontinuous at K1 = KA(α) whenever KA(α) <
kA(1), by definition kE(K1, α) is also discontinuous at K1 = KA(α) < kA(1).
Note also that for K1 ≤ KA(α) ≤ kA(1) the task allocation within firm is
efficient, while for K1 ∈ (KA(α), kA(1)) it is not. It follows that, whenever
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KA(α) < kA(1) we have
W F (KA(α), α) > lim
K1→KA(α)+
W F (K1, α),
and therefore
kE(KA(α), α) > lim
K1→KA(α)+
kE(K1, α)
At every point at which kE(K1, α) is differentiable with respect to K1, by





1 if (K1 −KA(α))(kE(K1, α)− kA(α)) ≥ 0
σ1(A)
σ1(B)
if K1 −KA(α) < 0 & kE(K1, α)− kA(α) > 0
σ1(B)
σ1(A)
if K1 −KA(α) > 0 & kE(K1, α)− kA(α) < 0.
Similarly, at every point at which kE(K1, α) is differentiable with respect to












We can therefore write
kE(K1, α) =
Z(K1, α) if K1 ≤ KA(α)Y (K1, α) otherwise,
where Z(K1, α) and Y (K1, α) are two continuous functions, increasing in K1
and decreasing in α, with Z(K1, α) = Y (K1, α) forK1 ≥ kA(1) and Z(K1, α) >
Y (K1, α) for K1 < kA(1).
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We can now compute18















































which is continuous because the integrand has only finitely many discontinu-
ities.
It follows that















































< 0, and Y (KA(α), α) < Z(KA(α), α)
(so that the last terms in brackets is negative), and continuous because, again,
∂kE(K1,α)
∂α





∂pr{k1 > kE(K1, α)}
∂α
− (1− pr{k1 > kE(K1, α)})
is negative at α = 0 because









































1− pr{k1 > kE(K1, α = 1)}
)





1{kE(K1, α) > 0}
1
λK1








18 Remember that, by definition, kE(K1, α) can be greater that λK1 or smaller that zero.
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where we used the fact that at α = 1, Z(K1, α = 1) = K1, that is, assuming
that the task allocation is efficient and that there are no labor market frictions,
agents become entrepreneurs only if they have a project that is more valuable
than that of firms. Furthermore KA(α = 1) = 0, and hence kE(K1, α = 1) ≤
K1, and Y (KA(α = 1), α = 1) < 0.
Define K̃ ≡ K1 : kE(K1, α = 1) = 0. We can write
pr{k1 > kE(K1, α = 1)} =pr{K1 < K̃1}
+(1− pr{K1 < K̃1})·pr{k1 > kE(K1, α = 1)|kE(K1, α = 1) > 0}
and
pr{kE(K1, α = 1) > 0} = 1− pr{K1 < K̃1}








1{kE(K1, α) > 0}
1
λK1








+ (1− pr{K1 < K̃1}) · pr{k1 > kE(K1, α = 1)|kE(K1, α = 1) > 0}











is decreasing for α sufficiently close to 0, and
increasing for α sufficiently close to 1.
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which are both negative at α = 0 since, by Lemma 2, PE1 (α) is decreasing at
α = 0. They are both positive at α = 1 if and only if
∂PE1 (α = 1)
∂α
(λ− 1) > PE1 (α = 1)














Proof of Lemma 3
Assume that α is sufficiently low so that KA(α) ≥ kA(1). In this case, the
task allocation within firms maximizes the two-period output. That is, if an
agent works for a firm, he is allocated to task τ1 = A if and only if












At the same time, entrepreneurs set τ1 = A if and only if








Hence, for any α such that KA(α) ≥ kA(1), if all agents who receive a wage
offer become workers — so that there is no selection into different professions
based on k1 — the probability that a worker is allocated to τ = A is greater
than the probability that an entrepreneur is allocated to τ = A.
To conclude the proof, we need to address the issue of selection into en-
trepreneurship based on k1. We use the fact that agents become entrepreneurs
if they have a sufficiently valuable project, which makes them less likely to
choose the task allocation that maximizes learning. Note that an agent who
receives a wage offer chooses to be an entrepreneur rather than working for a
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Therefore, for every K1, there is a threshold k(K1) > K1 such that for every
k1 ≥ k(K1) the agent becomes an entrepreneur, and for every k1 ≤ k(K1) the
agent becomes a worker. Suppose that K1 ≤ kA(1), so that all workers are
allocated to τ = A. It is easy to see that entrepreneurs are allocated to task
τ = B with positive probability. Suppose instead that K1 ≥ kA(1), so that
workers are allocated to task τ = B. Again, because k(K1) > K1 > kA(1)
all agents who become entrepreneurs also set τ = B. It follows that, among
agents who receive an offer, the unconditional probability (i.e., for any K1, k1)
of being allocated to task A is greater for workers than for entrepreneurs.
Proof of Lemma 4
When talent is vertical, we showed in the proof of Proposition 1 that p2(A, 0) <
p2(B, 0) < p1, which implies that failures always reduce the probability of
being a h type (more so when the failure is at task A). Because the function
πM(pt) is monotonically increasing, we have the inequalities πM(p2(A, 0)) <
πM(p2(B, 0)) < π
M(p1), and hence and failures decrease the probability of
success in period 2 relative to the initial probability of success.
Instead, in the horizontal case low types are more likely to succeed at task
B than high types and therefore p2(A, 0) < p1 < p2(B, 0). Furthermore, the
function πM(p2) is decreasing for p2 < q∗ and then increasing, implying that
πM(p2(A, 0)) > π
M(p1). Note also that there is a threshold value of p1 below
which πM(p2(B, 0)) < πM(p1) (failures at B are bad news) and above which
πM(p2(B, 0)) > π
M(p1) (failures at B are good news). If p1 is so low that
p1 < p2(B, 0) < q
∗, then quite immediately failures are bad news. Whenever
instead p1 < q∗ < p2(B, 0) we have that πM(p1) is monotonically decreasing
in p1 < q∗, but πM(p2(B, 0)) is monotonically increasing in p1. The statement
therefore follows by continuity.
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Proof of Proposition 3
For given project value k1 the probability that an entrepreneur sets τ1 = A
increases with α. At the same time α determines the set of k1 that will be
pursued by agents who receive a wage offer and become entrepreneurs. For
these agents, as α increases, the set of projects that are pursued enlarges:
smaller k1 are pursued by entrepreneurs. These projects are the ones for which
the entrepreneurs are more likely to choose τ1 = A. Overall, the probability
of setting τ1 = A increases with α, which implies that the probability of
succeeding in period 2, also increase with α.
The second part of the Proposition follows by Lemma 4. In the vertical
talent case the probability of period-2 success following a failure is always
below the initial probability of success πM(p1) ≡ σ1(B). In the horizontal
talent case failures at task A are always good news, while if p1 < qB failures
at task B are bad news. Hence, if talent is horizontal, α = 1 and λ low, for
any p1 < qB the majority of entrepreneurs are motivated by learning and set
τ1 = A. In this case, failures are good news. As α decreases, the majority
of entrepreneurs are opportunity entrepreneurs or necessity entrepreneurs who
set τ1 = A whenever








and B otherwise. Hence, as α decreases, entrepreneurs are more likely to
choose task B. Also, for given α, in the limit case p1 → 0, we have σ2(A) →
σ2(B) and all entrepreneur choose task B and entrepreneurial failures are bad
news. By continuity, there exists a p1 and α < 1 such that entrepreneurial
failures are bad news.
B Unobservable Task Allocation
When past task allocation is not observable outside of the firm, at the begin-
ning of period 2 there may be asymmetry of information between firms and
any agent who did not work for the same firm previously. We restrict our
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analysis of this problem to the case α = 1. Our goal is to show that the basic
finding of the model in the text persists: the learning motive for entrepreneur-
ship emerges when α is high. (It is quite immediate to see that as α decreases
the learning motive for entrepreneurship disappears.)
Screening equilibria. Suppose that in period 2, for every observable history,
firms offer a contract for every possible type, where a contract has the form
{b, f, τ2} i.e., a bonus, fixed payment, and a task allocation. Clearly, if the
agent produced a success in the previous period, a menu of contracts {b, f, τ2 =
A} and {b′, f ′, τ2 = B} such that f + qb = f ′ + qb′ = K2 is an equilibrium
screening menu of contracts, because each firm makes zero profits, agents of
different types prefer different contracts (strictly so if b, b′ > 0), and the firm
has no incentive to implement a task allocation that is different from that
specified in the contract.19
However, in order to use such contracts, it must be the case that conditional
on a given outcome s1, those who worked at different period-1 tasks maximize
period-2 probability of success by working at different period-2 tasks. In other
words, after observing a failure, screening is possible if those who worked at
task τ1 = A should work in period 2 on task τ2 = B, and vice versa. Similarly,
after observing a success, screening is possible if those who worked at task
τ1 = A should work in period 2 again on task τ2 = A, and the same for those
who worked on task τ1 = B.
This condition is never satisfied when talent is vertical. In this case, suc-
cesses (whether at task τ1 = A or task τ1 = B) increase the probability that
the agent is of type h and that he should be allocated to task τ2 = A. Similarly
failures (whether at task τ1 = A or task τ1 = B) increase the probability that
the agent is of type l and that he should be allocated to task B. Hence, in
general, screening is not possible when talent is vertical.20
19 Note that this contract amounts to delegating task allocation to the worker. Delegation
is possible because, in period 2, workers and firms have aligned preferences regarding task
allocation.
20 It may still, however, be possible to screen conditional on a given period-1 outcome, but
not on the other outcome.
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Screening is possible whenever talent is horizontal and p1 is sufficiently
close to p?. In this case, successes at task τ1 = A or task τ1 = B make it more
likely that the agent should work at that task in period 2 as well. Similarly,
failures at task τ1 = A or task τ1 = B makes it more likely that the agent
should work at the other task in period 2. If the initial prior is sufficiently
uncertain, conditional on the outcome s1 there is a one-to-one correspondence
between τ1 and τ2 maximizing period-2 probability of success.
No-screening equilibrium. If workers past task allocation is not observable
and screening is not possible, then the contract offered by firms to former
workers depends on the market belief over the workers previous task allocation.
It is easy to show, however, that there is no equilibrium in which firms set
τ1 = A with probability 1. If the market expects τ1 = A, then the period-1
employer makes zero profits in period 2. Hence, he is better off by maximizing
period-1 output and setting τ1 = B. Of course, it is possible that, in equi-
librium firms set τ1 = A with positive probability (but less than 1). Still, as
in the body of the text, also here some agents may decide to become learning
entrepreneurs. The reason is that workers prefer to work on task A (with prob-
ability 1) if K1 ≤ kA(1). Hence, if k1 < K1 but K1 − k1 is sufficiently small,
some agents will become entrepreneurs despite the fact that their project value
is lower of that of firms.
C Long-Term Contracts
In the text we assume that long-term contracts are not available. In this
section, we relax this assumption by introducing the possibility that, in period
1, firms and workers can sign a contract specifying a wage for period 2. Again,
we limit our attention to the case α = 1 (no labor-market frictions) and show
that the learning motive for entrepreneurship also emerges with long-term
contracts. (As in the previous extension of the model, as α decreases the
learning motive for entrepreneurship disappears since firms use the efficient
task allocation.)
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To start, note that if firms can shutdown at no cost, then there is no
equilibrium in which firms set τ1 = A with positive probability. As long as
workers can freely leave a firm, competition requires that firms’ make zero
profits in period 2. Hence, a firm period-2 profits are always zero, whether it
continues its operation or not. However, if in equilibrium τ1 = A, a firm is
better off by switching to τ1 = B and then shutting down the firm (to avoid
having to pay the wage corresponding to τ1 = A in period 2). Hence, the
equilibrium is the same as with short-term contracts.
Suppose instead that firms can commit not to shut down. Long-term con-
tracting does not affect our main qualitative result as long as workers are free
to move across firms and occupations. Our argument rests on the fact that
a period-1 worker may become an entrepreneur in period 2, which limits the
period-2 profits a firm may expect to make from learning its worker’s talent
in period 1.
If workers are free to leave, any long-term contract signed in period-1 should
pay in period 2 at least the period-2 market wage. Therefore, in period 2 a
long-term contract pays the worker a wage — contingent on success or failure
in period 1 and on period 2 project K2 — equal to the market value of this
worker if he had been allocated to task A in period 1.
Assume that such a contract is signed. We argue here that the firm may
deviate and set τ1 = B. For givenK2, this deviation delivers an expected loss in
period-2 equal toK2(σ2(A)−σ2(B)), because the employee will have to be paid
as if he had worked on task A while instead he worked on task B. However,
this loss is realized only if the agent does not become an entrepreneur and
continues working for the firm, and hence it is discounted by the probability
that k2 > K2, which is monotonically increasing in λ. At the same time, such
deviation increases the probability of success in period 1 and therefore delivers
a period-1 gain equal to (σ1(B)− σ1(A))(K1 − b).
It is easy to see that for λ sufficiently large, the probability that the worker
will continue working for the same firm vanishes to zero and the firm will
deviate to τ1 = B. Hence, for λ large, long-term contracts do not always im-
plement the worker-preferred task allocation and therefore the learning motive
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for entrepreneurship survives.
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